THE RECAPTURE OF CYRENAICA: THE ROLE OF BRITISH VULNERABILITY IN THE SUCCESS OF THE AFRIKA KORPS
Soon after the arrival of the German Afrika Korps to the North African front in February 1941, the Axis forces launched a rapid and spectacular offensive against their British foes. From near total defeat, the Axis powers rebounded to near total victory in North Africa. Before the Axis advance was stopped, Germans with their Italian allies were almost in Alexandria, Egypt. Defeated at El Alamei(1), however, they were forced into a retreat that finally ended with defeat in 1943.(2)
In the first stage of the campaign, the wild dash across the Libyan province of Cyrenaica, the Germans and Italians brushed aside all resistance. In a matter of weeks they had retaken all the land the Italians had lost to the British in 1940. Once again the Axis powers controlled Cyrenaica, and stood on the doorsteps of Egypt.
The mercurial recapture of Cyrenaica has often been attributed to the genius of the commander of the Afrika Korps, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. This may be true, but an equally important factor was the British themselves. To a large degree, the success of this Axis offensive was due to the vulnerability of the British. Repeatedly, the British enticed the opportunistic Rommel, forcing his hand by provoking him with opportunities for victory that he could not resist. In particular, two battles during the spring of 1941, El Agheila and Mersa Brega, and the events leading up to and surrounding them, illustrate this point. A combination of British vulnerability and Rommel's own wily, predatory instinct led to the outcome of these battles, and to the enactment of one of the Second World War's most dramatic episodes: the recapture of Cyrenaica.
On September 13, 1940, the Italian Libyan army crossed the border into Egypt.(3) Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini,(4) launched this invasion with the assurance that, no longer held in check by the French army in Tunisia, he possessed a four to one numerical superiority over the British in Egypt. On the sea, as well, Italy surpassed the British in numbers. Italy had more battleships, and forced the British to consider evacuating the Mediterranean.(5)
By September 16, 1940 the Italians, under the command of Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, were sixty miles inside the Egyptian frontier. There they stopped to establish a strong base. In the process, however, the Italians had overextended their communications lines. Thus, already bereft of adequate communications, disaster struck when the British Western Desert Force (W.D.F) counter-attacked on December 9.(6)
Known as "Wavell's offensive, for the commander of the British forces,(7) General Archibald Percival Wavell,(8) the British counter-offensive pushed the Italians not only out of Egypt, but forced them back into Cyrenaica in a 400-mile retreat.(9) The W.D.F's 7th Armored Division managed to outflank the retreating Italian Tenth Army. With the 6th Australian Division hitting its rearguards, the Italian army was forced to surrender. The capture of the Italian Tenth Army marked the crowning achievement of "Wavell's offensive."(10) Italy, bent on conquest, had been soundly beaten.
"Wavell's offensive" drew to a halt at the town of El Agheila(11) on February 8, 1941. The Italian army hardly existed anymore.(12) Over 130,000 Italian soldiers were captured. Even the Italian fleet was twice defeated, at Taranto harbor and Cape Matapan, in July and November 1940, respectively.(13) In Tripoli, Libya many Italians hoped to be evacuated to the mainland.(14) In short, Italy's once powerful role in the Mediterranean region had been shaken, and every front was on the verge of collapsing.(15)
Adolf Hitler, realizing the danger of losing his Italian ally--a loss which would expose his southern front to British invasion by sea--(16) on February 11, 1941 created the Afrika Korps.(17) A small army thrown together on the spur of the moment, with no training in desert warfare,(18) the Afrika Korps consisted of only two regiments, the Fifth Light and the Fifth Panzer. They had, however, been promised a complete Panzer Division by May.(19) Hitler's choice to head this newly created unit was Lieutenant-General(20) Erwin Rommel,(21) a general possessing an excellent comraderie with his troops.(22) Rommel had proven himself an exemplary commander the year before in the invasion of France, commanding the 7th Panzer Division. The 7th was so swift and surprising that it became known as the "'Ghost Division. '"(23)
Rommel arrived at Tripoli on February 12, 1941,(24) and immediately began personal reconnaissance. He then determined to establish a forward defensive position near Sirte, a town about halfway between Tripoli and El Agheila.(25) Rommel's desires did not pass without some argument from General Italo Gariboldi (Gariboldi had replaced Marshal Graziani as commander of the Italian army in Libya) (26) who favored a more cautious approach. Although technically subordinate to Gariboldi,(27) Rommel was in command of all Axis forces on the front. Clearly, the Germans were in control.(28) Rommel sent the Italian Ariete Division and two Italian infantry divisions ahead to Sirte, followed two days later by a German antitank and a reconnaissance battalion.(29)
But Rommel's forces had
not completed their transfer to Africa,(30) and all that really stood between the British and
Tripoli were sixty outdated Italian tanks(31) and the advance units of the Afrika Korps. Working
on the premise that a show of strength would prevent the British
from making a move before he could build up his real strength,(32) Rommel staged a parade in the main piazza of
Tripoli. To misinform any spies who might be watching, Rommel
circled the few tanks he had around several blocks of the city
and then back through the piazza, making his force appear much
larger than it actually was.(33)
Even if British spies were watching, General Wavell did not believe the Axis could make an offensive move before May. The British Director of Intelligence made the suggestion that the Afrika Korps might make a sudden thrust into Cyrenaica. Despite this warning, Wavell contended such an attack would simply be too risky, therefore, it would not come.(34)
This smug belief, that the Germans and Italians would remain on the defensive, seemed prevalent in the British military hierarchy.(35) Through the deciphering of the German "Enigma" code machine, Wavell knew of official German orders(36) for Rommel to only conduct reconnaissance.(37) What Wavell failed to take into consideration was Rommel himself.(38) Rommel was capable of incredible guile--as when he and a handful of men captured over 1500 Italian soldiers during a single episode in World War I.(39) Indeed, Rommel had intended from the beginnings of his assignment to disobey orders and go immediately on the offensive in Libya. In a real sense, Wavell knew too much about Rommel's orders and not enough about the man.(40)
Even if General Wavell had made the correct assessment of Rommel's intentions, he was in no position to counter them. As the Afrika Korps was entering Libya, the British were leaving.(41) When Winston Churchill decided to fulfill his agreement to protect Greece,(42) Britain intervened in the Adriatic country in early March 1941. Historian Richard Collier writes that the diversion of British forces for use in the Greek campaign, "stripped British defenses in eastern Libya to the bone."(43) Cyrenaica strategically became a minimum priority, with minimum forces present to protect it from attack. Collier continues, "What was left [in Cyrenaica] amounted to little more than an ill-trained, badly equipped infantry division and a weak, inexperienced armored brigade, with tanks that kept breaking down under desert conditions."(44) The Western Desert force had been "cannibalized" for the defense of Greece.(45)
There was very little, then, standing in Rommel's way. Rommel was a man to whom opportunity meant exploitation, even if doing so was in violation of orders;(46) and the opportunity developing in Cyrenaica proved more than Rommel could resist. After a small firefight fifty miles beyond Sirte, Rommel ordered the 5th Light Division to advance to El Mugtaa, a hamlet 150 miles east of Sirte. This move established the next logical target as El Agheila.(47) The Afrika Korps was moving east.
El Agheila was located in the bend of the Cyrenaican coastline, about 150 miles from the port of Benghazi.(48) The town was, according to one of Rommel's former aides, the "... strongest defensive position in the country.(49) Obviously, the British were probably going to make a stand at El Agheila.(50)
Rommel and his Afrika Korps were now within striking range of El Agheila, all that was needed was an opportunity. The opportunity came on March 23 when Rommel received reports that British forces were thinning out at El Agheila. Rommel could not resist the urge to strike.(51) So, before travelling to Berlin for a meeting with his superiors, Rommel left orders for his men to attack the British position at El Agheila on the 24th of March.(52) His leaders, however, informed Rommel that there were no plans for an aggressive move in North Africa.(53) Rommel was informed that after receiving reinforcement from the 15th Panzer Division in late May, he was to attack Agedabia and possibly Benghazi, both on the Libyan coast. The general contended that Benghazi could not be held alone, and therefore, he should occupy all of the province of Cyrenaica.(54) Rommel's commanders had a reason for not wanting a serious offensive in Africa: they were preparing for the invasion of Russia in June. Nothing could be spared for a "sideshow" in Africa.(55)
Rommel rationalized his unauthorized assault on El Agheila on the fact that British patrols stationed there were harassing his supply columns headed to Marada, an Axis outpost ninety miles to the south. Protecting Marada, then, meant capturing El Agheila.(56) Or so he claimed, but surely Rommel's decision to attack was not based solely on protecting supply columns. Rommel believed the secret to mastery of warfare was to keep moving.(57) The British had ceased their offensive, and Rommel seized their moment of inactivity to take the initiative. He also had an almost mystical ability to sense the best course of action.(58) Perhaps Rommel sensed somehow that, even though he was ordered not to, the time to attack had come. Certainly, these aspects of the man played a role in his order to attack El Agheila. Then too, he was, according to Collier, "...a master of the unexpected."(59) And the British did not expect Rommel to attack their stronghold at El Agheilai.(60)
The British commander was the recently assigned Lieutenant-General Philip Neame. Though a brave soldier, he was not familiar with desert warfare. The assault began at dawn on March 24. The 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion's tanks and armored cars charged along a 1000 yard front straight toward the town,(61) while vehicles in the rear were following Rommel's explicit order, "Rear vehicles to raise dust-nothing but dust."(62) Many of the vehicles in the assault were fakes, members of the so-called "cardboard division," but in the clouds of dust raised they appeared to give the Germans a considerable force. The British, seeing what they believed to be an impressive enemy contingent, withdrew to Mersa Brega.(63)
The "cardboard division" was perhaps Rommel's most ingenious deceptive technique. With a few Fiat and Volkswagen chassis, covered with pasteboard "armor" and gun barrels cut from telegraph poles,(64) Rommel had duped the British into retreating without a fight. He also discovered that the feared Western Desert Force was, as Blanco writes, only a "paper lion."(65)
Among the British leadership, despite the loss of the most easily defended location in Cyrenaica, little seemed amiss. Churchill cabled Wavell, "I presume you are only waiting for the tortoise to stick his head out far enough before chopping it off."(66) Wavell replied to Churchill that even though he did not have the men to reinforce Neame, he was none-the-less convinced Rommel would not begin any major offensive anytime soon. Then, the day before the assault of Mersa Brega, Wavell wired Neame that he did not believe Rommel could make any large movement for at least a month.(67) Churchill and Wavell, it seems, were completely unaware of the danger they faced. Because of the many battlefronts under his command, Wavell was preoccupied with large scale, strategic plans, and could not give each campaign the attention it deserved. Greece and Crete were accented during critical weeks to the detriment of North Africa. Rommel, however, could afford to exert his attention on North Africa.(68)
The British made all the wrong moves in dealing with Erwin Rommel. Like other professional German soldiers, Rommel took war with a seriousness the British reserved only for sports.(69) And playing is exactly what the British seem to have been doing in Cyrenaica. No serious thought was given to a possible Axis offensive because Wavell expected Rommel to play by the rules of "military commonsense."(70) Rommel, however, did not play by the rules. He fought to win.
Rommel's motto was "Sturm, Swung, Wucht: attack, impetus, weight. "(71) He had gained the advantage of momentum at El Agheila, and now he applied the weight of his force to the British front. While El Agheila was not originally intended to be the start of a major campaign to recapture Cyrenaica, the momentum of victory drove Rommel onward.(72) Rommel now turned toward Mersa Brega.
Mersa Brega lay forty miles beyond El Agheila,(73) flanked by the sea and salt marshes, and built on sandy hills. It was a natural defensive bottleneck on the way to Benghazi.(74) After waiting for a week, Rommel decided he must force the British out before they could strengthen their position.(75) Furthermore, one of Rommel's principles was to always attack a sluggish enemy--which urged him to order a frontal assault on April 1.(76)
The assault proved difficult, but the result was predictable. By late afternoon, the 5th Light Division was for a time quite vulnerable, confused, and trying to reorganize in the dust raised by the battle. The British characteristically failed to exploit this advantage. The commander of the British 3rd Armored Brigade failed to answer their comrade's call for aid, fearing there was too little time left before dark to counterattack successfully.(77) When Mersa Brega fell, what ensued was almost a repeat performance of the Italian retreat just a few months before. Only this time, the British were in retreat.
The Afrika Korps' victory at Mersa Brega, their first against a determined and resilient enemy, boosted their morale, and proved Ronimel's assumption that the British were vulnerable,(78) and that as a consequence all of Cyrenaica lay before him, ripe for conquest. When Rommel received reconnaissance reports that the British were, in the general's words, "tending to draw back," he "could not resist"(79) the temptation to attack Agedabia. Rommel made this decision despite his orders not to attack that position until late May.(80) At Mersa Brega, the British had begun a 500-mile retreat(81) that by April 11 placed Rommel in approximately the area from which the British had begun "Wavell's offensive" only a brief four months before.(82) The cycle had come full circle, and now Rommel contemplated the invasion of Egypt.
As the battles of El Agheila and Mersa Brega demonstrate, British mistakes and miscalculations opened the Pandora's box of Rommel's aggression. At every step the British seem to have been ill-prepared for the unique enemy they faced. In fact, the only serious care the British military establishment seems to have given to the defense of Cyrenaica was in a visit by General Wavell to the forward British positions in mid-March. But by then, Wavell later admitted, it was too late to have any real effect. During his tour, Wavell changed his opinion about the defensibility of the escarpment south of Benghazi, seeing then that it was anything but defensible. Wavell found the state of the British armor particularly distressing. Half of the core tanks of the 2nd Armored Division were undergoing repairs, and more were constantly breaking down.(83) The true irony of Wavell's discovery of the weakness of his forces is that he knew of it before the Axis attacks on El Agheila and Mersa Brega. One must admit that Wavell believed there was little that could be done to remedy the situation, yet he continued to insist to Churchill and his subordinates, that Rommel would not attack before May.(84) How could he have been so arrogant as to preclude the possibility of an Axis major offensive, when he knew that if such an attack did occur, his men were in no shape to repel it?
In a careful study of the recapture of Cyrenaica, a major point seems clear: The British made a succession of serious errors and miscalculations, which in turn enticed Rommel's personal guile, facilitated by his masterful use of deception, and what is more important, his instinct of predation. The combination of these factors was initially the spark, and later the fuel, that fired the conflagration of the recapture of Cyrenaica.
ENDNOTES
1. Richard Collier, The War in the Desert, ed.
William K. Goolrick, rev. ed. World War II Series (Alexandria,
Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc., 1981), 115.
2. lbid., 198.
3. John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 327.
4. John Keegan, ed., Who Was Who in World War II (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Publishers, 1978), 152.
5. Keegan, The Second World War, 327-328.
6. lbid.
7. Major K.J. Macksey, Afrika Korps, with a foreword by Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Ballantine's Illustrated History of World War II Campaign Book, No.1 (New York: Ballantine Books Inc., 1968), 6.
8. John Connell, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1964), 27.
9. Keegan The Second World War, 328.
10. lbid.
11. Collier, The War in the Desert, 61.
12. Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1961), 61.
13. Keegan, The Second World War, 327-328.
14. Collier, The War in the Desert, 61.
15. Macksey, Afrika Korps, 8.
16. lbid.
17. Richard L. Blanco, Rommel the Desert Warrior: The Afrika Korps in World War II (New York: Simon & Schuster Division, 1982), 26.
18. Ibid.
19. lbid., 35.
20. Richard Brett-Smith, Hitler's Generals (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1977), 253.
21. Kenneth Macksey, Rommel: Battles and Campaigns (New York: Mayflower Books, Inc., 1979), 49.
22. Dal McGuirk, Afrikakorps: Self Portrait (Shewsbury, England: Airlife Publishing, Ltd., 1992), 58.
23. Collier, The War in the Desert, 40.
24. Keegan, The Second World War, 329.
25. Collier The War in the Desert, 61.
26. Ibid.
27. Blanco, Rommel the Desert Warrior, 38-39.
28. Macksey, Afrika Korps, 15.
29. Collier, The War in the Desert, 61.
30. Macksey, Afrika Korps, 13.
31. Collier, The War in the Desert, 40.
32. Blanco, Rommel the Desert Warrior, 40.
33. Collier, The War in the Desert, 60.
34. Macksey, Afrika Korps, 17.
35. Blanco, Rommel the Desert Warrior, 43.
36. Macksey, Rommel: Battles and Campaigns, 56.
37. Macksey, Afrika Korps, 15.
38. Macksey, Rommel: Battles and Campaigns, 55-56.
39. Desmond Young, Rommel: The Desert Fox, with a foreword by Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck (New York: Harper, 1950; reprint, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., Quill Books, 1978), 20 (page references are to reprint edition).
40. Macksey, Afrika Korps, 56.
41. Keegan, The Second World War, 328.
42. Barnett, The Desert Generals, 58.
43. Collier, The War in the Desert, 61.
44. Ibid., 61-63.
45. lbid.
46. Blanco, Rommel the Desert Warrior, 29.
47. Ibid., 40.
48. lbid.
49. Heinz-Werner Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert: In Victory and Defeat with the Commander of the Afrika Korps, A Ballantine War Book (South Africa: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1951; reprint, New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1967), 200.
50. Blanco, Rommel the Desert Warrior, 40.
51. Macksey, Rommel: Battles and Campaigns, 53.
52. Charles Douglas-Home, Rommel, with an introduction by Lord Chalfont (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1973), 87.
53. Blanco, Rommel the Desert Warrior, 40.
54. B.H. Liddell-Hart, ed., The Rommel Papers, trans. Paul Findlay, with the assistance of Lucie-Maria Rommel, Manfred Rommel, and General Fritz Bayerlein, 15th ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953; reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1982), 106 (page references are to reprint edition); Macksey, Rommel: Battles and Campaigns, 52, map.
55. Blanco, Rommel the Desert Warrior, 40.
56. Collier, The War in the Desert, 63.
57. Douglas-Home, Rommel, 87.
58. Young, Rommel: The Desert Fox, 23.
59. Collier, The War in the Desert, 36.
60. Ibid., 63.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., 63-64.
63. Ibid., 64.
64. Blanco, Rommel the Desert Warrior, 41.
65. Ibid., 43.
66. Collier, The War in the Desert, 64.
67. Ibid.
68. Douglas-Home, Rommel, 92.
69. Young, Rommel: The Desert Fox, 21-22.
70. Macksey, Afrika Korps, 17.
71. Collier, The War in the Desert, 60.
72. Douglas-Home, Rommel, 87.
73. Ibid.
74. Blanco, Rommel the Desert Warrior, 43-44.
75. Collier, The War in the Desert, 64.
76. Blanco, Rommel the Desert Warrior, 44.
77. Macksey, Afrika Korps, 17.
78. Ibid., 17-19.
79. Liddell-Hart, The Rommel Papers, 109.
80. lbid.
81. Collier, The War in the Desert, 65.
82. Keegan, The Second World War, 329.
83. Collier, The War in the Desert, 63.
84. Macksey, Afrika Korps, 17.